Tomorrow morning (29 September), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution extending the mandate of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) for another six months, until 31 March 2027. The draft resolution also requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide logistical and operational support through the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH). Panama and the US—the co-penholders on Haiti—authored the draft text.
Background
The GSF—a non-UN multinational mission established by the Council to combat armed gangs in Haiti—was first authorised on 30 September 2025 through resolution 2793 for an initial period of 12 months. The resolution also requested that the Secretary-General establish UNSOH. It received 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (China, Pakistan, and Russia). The GSF succeeded the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti.
Following the departure in April of Kenyan troops, who formed the bulk of the MSS mission in Haiti, some contingents and personnel from new troop-contributing countries, such as Chad, Jamaica, Mongolia, and Sri Lanka, arrived in Haiti. According to the Secretary-General’s latest report on the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), as at 8 July, the GSF’s military component comprised 1,083 personnel, while the civilian component comprised 16 staff members. UNSOH has been fully operational since 1 April.
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
The co-penholders circulated an initial draft of the text to Council members on 4 September, inviting comments until 9 September. Following an in-person negotiation session on 10 September, the co-penholders circulated a first revised draft on 14 September, which was discussed during a second informal negotiation meeting on 16 September. Panama and the US then circulated a second revised draft on 18 September and put it under silence until 23 September. China broke silence, after which several members sent comments. It seems, however, that no further amendments were made to the draft, and on Saturday (26 September) the co-penholders put the second revised version of the draft resolution in blue, to be voted on tomorrow.
Panama and the US opted for a short text which diplomats have been referring to as a technical rollover. (The term “technical rollover” is generally used to describe a concise resolution extending a peace operation’s mandate without altering its core mandate or tasks, often for a shorter period than is customary.) It appears that the co-penholders proposed a six-month rollover in light of the fact that the GSF has yet to reach full operational capacity, which might only be achieved towards the end of the year.
The length of the GSF re-authorisation and the possibility of carrying out a review of the mission’s mandate were key issues of contention during the negotiations. It appears that China and Russia proposed limiting the renewal to three months instead of six, and requested the inclusion of language requesting an independent strategic review of progress towards lasting stability in Haiti. The suggested review would apparently have focused on both Haiti’s own efforts and the role and effectiveness of international security support to the country, including the GSF, and would have been intended to inform the Council’s consideration of the situation and further deliberations ahead of the next renewal. (During the negotiations on resolution 2793, China and Russia cited several concerns, including regarding the need for clarity on matters such as the GSF’s rules of engagement, troop composition, costs, success criteria, and accountability.)
It seems that China, supported by Russia, broke silence on the second revised draft because these and other proposals had not been incorporated. Most other members, however, apparently supported renewing the GSF’s mandate for six months, with some stressing that a shorter renewal would not afford sufficient time for the mission to become fully operational. Similarly, most members apparently believed that conducting a review before the GSF reaches full operational capacity would be premature and diminish the Council’s ability to fully assess the implementation and effectiveness of the mandate. The draft resolution in blue retains the six-month timeframe for the renewal and does not include language on a strategic review.
It seems that a significant area of discussion during the negotiations was language on the legal personality of the GSF and privileges and immunities for the force and its personnel. Early in the negotiations, Greece apparently proposed adding a reference asking for all member states to recognise the legal personality, privileges, and immunities of the GSF in line with an agreement on this matter signed between the government of Haiti and the GSF on 27 July. (While the agreement has not been made public, it seems that a copy was made available to Council members during the negotiations.) This apparently follows Special Representative for the GSF Jack Christofides having raised concerns with Council members regarding the granting of relevant immunities to the GSF and its personnel, including in light of the fact that the GSF is not a UN mission and therefore the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations would apparently not apply.
It seems that, in response, the co-penholders introduced in the first revised draft language welcoming the 27 July agreement as well as other agreements extending to the GSF and its personnel the “status and protections necessary for the continued independent exercise of their functions” and calling on member states to “acknowledge” the GSF’s legal status and to accord the mission and its personnel these privileges and immunities.
It appears, however, that many Council members, while supporting the rationale for including language on this issue, preferred a more cautious approach. Some concerns apparently included avoiding pressing member states to recognise the GSF’s legal status through language that would call on or urge them to do so. These members apparently maintained that this should remain a bilateral decision for each member state and were concerned that this could create a precedent for future non-UN missions.
The draft text “notes” the 27 July agreement as well as “other arrangements extending to the GSF and its personnel the status and protections necessary for the continued independent exercise of their functions”. It also “encourages” member states to “take measures, as appropriate, to acknowledge the legal status of the GSF and accord to the GSF and its personnel the privileges and immunities necessary for the continued independent exercise of their functions”.
There was also discussion regarding the Council’s messaging on the importance of accountability for potential international law violations, particularly in light of the history of impunity for alleged violations by international troops involved in peacekeeping in Haiti. It seems, for instance, that Denmark, supported by such members as France, Latvia, and the UK, proposed adding language reaffirming that the GSF is authorised to carry out its mandate “with the highest standards of transparency, conduct and discipline” and in strict compliance with international law, including international human rights law (IHRL).
Language based on Denmark’s proposal was included in the draft resolution , albeit with some amendments. The draft text recalls that the GSF is authorised to carry out its mandate in strict compliance with international law, including IHRL, “as applicable”, and reiterates the Council’s request that states which participate in the GSF “ensure the highest standards of transparency, conduct and discipline for their contingents”.
China also apparently proposed several references to the illegal flow of arms and the implementation of the Security Council’s arms embargo on Haiti. One such reference would have reaffirmed the Council’s determination to continue to take effective measures to stem the illicit flow of arms and ammunitions into Haiti and recalled the GSF’s mandate under resolution 2793 to support efforts to combat trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel. Another proposal apparently reiterated the need to prohibit “at the source” the transfer of arms and related materiel to non-state actors that are supporting gang violence and human rights abuses. (The latest report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, issued on 14 July, found that “[t]he clearest documented external illicit supply line remains the United States of America-Haiti firearms corridor, operating through maritime cargo channels and adaptive transnational trafficking networks.”)
It seems that the co-penholders added a reference emphasising that Haitian authorities have the primary responsibility for, among other things, addressing the causes of instability, including efforts to address corruption, undertake reforms, and “address the flow of illegal arms into the country”. Other suggested edits on this issue were not added by the co-penholders, who apparently argued that language on illicit arms trafficking should be addressed in the upcoming negotiations to renew the sanctions regime on Haiti in October.
According to some Council members, additional tensions between the US and China related to other files on the Council’s agenda might have played a role in the dynamics of these negotiations.
It appears that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), on behalf of the three African Council members (the DRC, Liberia, and Somalia), proposed several references to the situation of children in Haiti, including language on the continued recruitment and use of children by armed gangs and text emphasising the importance of integrating child protection as a crosscutting issue in the planning, conduct, monitoring, and evaluation of GSF operations.
In response to these requests, the co-penholders added language acknowledging the significant proportion of gang members who are children as a result of systematic recruitment efforts, and affirming the importance of the 2024 Handover Protocol between the UN and the Haitian government and recognising the need for “tailored reintegration programs, psychosocial support, and access to education for children formerly associated with gangs”.
Another proposed reference requesting the Secretary-General to report on measures taken by the GSF to implement child protection requirements contained in resolution 2793, including regarding the deployment of child protection actors and the implementation of procedures for the handover and referral of children encountered during GSF operations, was not included, however.
Based on a proposal by France, the draft resolution in blue also requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council every six months, as part of his regular reports on Haiti, on “the progress achieved by the Haitian authorities on the benchmarks pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 2793”. This refers to language in resolution 2793 on “benchmarks, indicators and dates to be met by the Haitian authorities in order to increase [the Haitian security forces’] capacities…and enhance Haiti’s management and control of its land, maritime and air borders and ports to combat illicit trafficking of arms, ammunitions and narcotics, with the goal of preparing the transition of tasks and responsibilities to the Government of Haiti”. This language was apparently aimed at ensuring that the Council receives regular updates on these matters, as resolution 2793 did not contain a reference to the timeline for the Secretariat’s reporting on this issue.